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LABOR LAW-THE ST.
TEST-Is IT NECESSARY?

FRANCIS

II DISPARITY OF INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION
Health care is a unique commodity. There exists a strong public
interest in the uninterrupted provision of quality care. The role of the
government in the area of labor relations in the health care industry is
to protect the interests of health care consumers while safeguarding
the right of employees to engage in concerted activity for their mutual
aid and protection. 1
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the agency
charged with overseeing the establishment and conduct of the collec
tive bargaining process in the private sector.2 One task assigned to the
Board by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the determina
tion of appropriate bargaining units within a given industry and enter
prise. 3 Ever since the enactment of the 1974 health care amendments
to the National Labor Relations Act,4 the Board has applied the com
munity of interest standard to determine appropriate bargaining units
in the health care industry. In 1984, in St. Francis Hospital & IBEW 5
[hereinafter St. Francis II], the Board reconsidered its earlier decision
1. In 1974, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act to extend its cover
age to hospital employees in the "not-for-profit" sector of the industry. National Labor
Relations Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
2. 29 U.S.c. § 153(b) (1982).
3. "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure employees the
fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdi
vision thereof. ..." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982). This determination of an appropriate unit is
important for several reasons. The size and occupational make-up of the bargaining unit
will greatly affect the outcome of the representation election. See Chaison, A nother View of
Union Organizing and the Small Employer, 19 MARQ. Bus. REV. 143 (1975); Rose, What
Factors Influence Union Representation Elections?, cited in Chaison, Unit Size and Union
Success in Representation Elections, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 1973, at 51-52 (1973).
Also, the unit chosen by the Board will circumscribe the bargaining goals (and bargaining
strength) of the parties. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 67 (2d ed. 1982).
In determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the Board tries to promote industrial peace
through a stable collective bargaining relationship while at the same time affording employ
ees freedom of choice. Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134,49 L.R.R.M. 1715
(1962).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974).
5. 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465 (1984).
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in St. Francis Hospital & JBEW 6 , [hereinafter St. Francis J] and
adopted a new standard for determining appropriate units in the
health care industry.7 To be certified as a separate unit, petitioning
employees must, under St. Francis II, demonstrate that a disparity of
interests exists between themselves and other non-management em
ployees, rather than showing that the employees in the requested unit
share a community of interest. 8
This note argues that applying the disparity of interests test will
not result in an appropriate balance between the right of professional
health care employees9 to organize under the Act and the public's
need for uninterrupted quality health care. The result of the new test
may be a sUbjugation of the professional employee's right to organize
rather than a balance. This result is at odds with the Act's goal of
encouraging collective bargaining. lO
Part One briefly examines the controversy between some courts of
appeals and the Board over the correct interpretation of the Congres
sional admonition against undue proliferation of bargaining units in
the health care industry. I I This conflict led to the NLRB's adoption
of the disparity of interests test. Part Two points out that this test
ignores empirical research which indicates that an expansion of unit
size among professional health care employees will hamper substan
tially their ability to organize and, more importantly, will eliminate
much of the incentive for professional health care employees to engage
in collective bargaining. It further contends that the predictable re
sults of the test will so discourage organizing among professional em
6.
7.
8.

265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153 (1982).
St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470.
Id.
9. This note discusses only the rights of professionals employed in hospitals and
health care institutions.
10.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recog
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamen
tal to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargain
ing power between employers and employees. . .. It is declared to be the policy of
the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they
have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
11. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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ployees as to effectively deny them the right of self-organization and
collective bargaining.
Finally, Part Three notes that in light of the safeguards already
present in the law, the Board's extension of the additional "protec
tion" of requiring larger professional employee units in the health care
industry is unwarranted and contrary to the "twin goals" of the 1974
amendments. 12
I

A.

BACKGROUND

The 1974 Health Care Amendments

The enactment of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act
gave all health care employees the right to engage in collective bar
gaining with their employers.'3 In 1947, the Labor-Management Re
lations (Taft-Hartley) Act excluded non-profit hospital employees
from the coverage of the NLRA.14 The 1974 health care amendments
12. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WEL
FARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 256-57 (1974) [hereinafter
HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS]. See also 120 CONGo REC.
13,560 (1974).
13. In re Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 44 N.L.R.B. 533 (1942), 145 F.2d
852 (D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945) (NLRA applies to non-profit, chari
table hospitals); National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449-57 (1936).
Although eligible for union membership, health care employees did not participate in the
mass organizing drives of the 1930's. Becker & Miller, Patterns and Determinants 0/ Union
Growth in the Hospital Industry, 2 J. LAB. RES. 309, 312 (1981). See generally R. MILLER,
HOSPITALS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EXPERIENCES (G.
G. Somers ed. 1980); R. MILLER, B. BECKER & E. KRINSKI, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON HOSPITALS (1979).
14. The LMRA removed non-profit hospitals from the definition of "employer," 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982), by adding language excluding "any corporation or association op
erating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private share
holder or individual." Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947). Responding to the pre-Wagner Act tactic of the recognition strike, some
states passed legislation (or their state labor board asserted jurisdiction over non-profit
health care employees) allowing employees in non-profit health care institutions to organ
ize. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 150A, § 9A (1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.35-179.39
(West 1947). See also J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE
ApPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT (1981); L. TANNER, H. WEINSTEIN & A. AHMUTY,
IMPACT OF THE 1974 HEALTH CARE AMENDMENTS TO THE NLRA ON COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 33 (1979).
In explaining the need for the amendments, the Senate committee report stated: "The
Committee was also impressed with the fact, emphasized by many witnesses, that the ex
emption of non-profit hospitals from the Act has resulted in numerous instances of recogni
tion strikes and picketing." S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3946, 3948. See also Delaney, Union Success in Hospital
Election, 20 INDUS. REL. 149, 150 (1981).
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to the NLRA removed the exclusionary language of the Taft-Hartley
Act.lS Lawmakers determined that it no longer made sense to leave
workers employed in this expanding sector of the economy outside the
protection of the Act. 16 These amendments advanced two basic pur
poses which have become known as the "twin goals" of the amend
ments: (1) to extend the right to organize and the right to bargain
collectively to non-profit sector health care employees; and (2) to as
sure a continued supply of quality health care to patients and
communities. 17
Congress recognized that there is a strong public interest in the
provision of health care services uninterrupted by labor disputes.
While strikes and work stoppages in most private sector industries
have an adverse effect on commerce, this effect is seldom immediate or
life-threatening. Disruptions in the flow of health care services could
have immediate and serious consequences to individual patients as
well as to entire communities.
Congress took steps to safeguard public access to uninterrupted,
quality health care. It admonished the National Labor Relations
Board to refrain from promoting the proliferation of bargaining units
in the health care industry. IS Along with extending to health care em
ployees the right to organize and bargain collectively, Congress modi
fied various sections of the National Labor Relations Act to restrict
the exercise of these rights. 19 As a result, health care employees exer
cise their collective bargaining rights and their rights to negotiate,
picket, and collectively withhold their labor in a very different statu
tory environment from other unionized private sector employees. 2o
At the same time, however, Congress referred to the extension of
15. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982) (deleting exclusionary language), and 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(14) (1982) (adding definition of health care institution).
16. In discussing the purpose of the amendments, the Senate committee stated:
The Committee could find no acceptable reason why 1,427,012 employees in
these non-profit, non-public hospitals representing 56% of all hospital employees,
should continue to be excluded from the coverage and protections of the Act. In
the Committee's deliberations on this measure, it was recognized that the needs of
patients in health care institutions required special consideration in the Act ...."
S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS 3946, 3948.
17. HISTORY OF THE COVERAGE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS, supra note 12, at 256
57; see also 120 CONGo REC. 13,560 (1974).
18. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
20. Major differences include: 29 U.S.c. § 158(d)(A) (1982) (lengthening the re
quired notice of contract expiration or termination period from 60 days to 90 days for
health care employees, including a lengthening of notice to the FMCS from 30 days to 60
days); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(B) (1982) (30 day notice to FMCS of a dispute on initial con
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collective bargaining rights to non-profit sector health care employees
as a "twin goal" of the 1974 amendments. 21 Congress intended that
these employees should have the right to choose whether they will use
the vehicle of collective bargaining to resolve their problems on the
job. Certainly, it is in the public interest that the government should
actively discourage health care employees from using "self-help"
methods such as recognition strikes. 22
Thus, the 1974 amendments set for the NLRB the delicate task of
balancing two co-equal social goals: fostering collective bargaining in
the non-profit health care industry while protecting public access to
uninterrupted, quality health care. 23 The application of the 1974
amendments, and the congressional admonition, are at the heart of the
controversy over appropriate bargaining units in the health care
industry.
B.

The Congressional Admonition Against Proliferation of
Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry

The large number of professions, crafts, and job classifications
present in the organization of the modern hospital creates the poten
tial for many separate bargaining units.24 Despite the congressional
admonition against it, bargaining unit proliferation may not, in itself,
be inherently wrong. 25 Rather, allowing the various professions,
crafts, and job classifications within a hospital each to obtain separate
tracts unique to health care); 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1982) (10 day notice requirement to insti
tutions by health care employees before engaging in any picketing).
21. See 120 CONGo REC. 13,560 (remarks by Sen. Humphrey).
22. "Coverage under the Act should completely eliminate the need for any such
activity, since the procedures of the Act will be available to resolve organizational and
recognitional disputes." S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3946, 3948.
23. See supra note 17.
24. What follows is a brief overview of the legislative history of the congressional
admonition against proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry and the
controversy between the Board and the courts of appeals regarding its interpretation. For
further analysis of the legislative history and the controversy itself, see Bumpass, Appropri
ate Bargaining Units in Health Care Institutions: An Analysis o/Congressionallntent and
its Implementation by The National Labor Relations Board, 20 B.C.L. REV. 867 (1979);
Feheley, Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act; Health Care Institutions, 36
OHIO ST. L.J. 235 (1975); Vernon, Labor Relations in the Health Care Field Under the
1974 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act: An Overview and Analysis, 70 Nw.
U.L. REV. 202 (1975).
25. However, multiple units invariably will increase administrative costs. Personnel
departments will be called upon to negotiate with a number of bargaining agents and ad
minister different contracts. Also, a multiple unit structure may give rise to "whipsawing"
and "leapfrogging" tactics by the competing unions and thus raise labor costs.
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representation may assure employees "the fullest freedom in exercising
the rights guaranteed by this [Act],"26 The Board would simply apply
the community of interests test to determine the appropriateness of the
unit petitioned for and decide the issue as it does in any other
industry.27
There are strong indications that this approach would result in a
multitude of separate bargaining units in an average modem hospi
tal.28 Modem American hospitals are highly developed bureaucra
cies. 29 The Board would apply its traditional "craft" criteria to an
industry where specialization and departmentalization are the rule.
Various medical support personnel, such as laboratory technologists,
physical therapists and psychiatric social workers, are likely to have
26. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (Supp. I 1983). See supra note 3.
27. In evaluating a petition to determine the appropriateness of the unit requested,
the Board looks at such factors as: (1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining
earnings; (2) similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and other terms and condi
tions of employment; (3) similarity in the kind of work performed; (4) similarity in training,
qualifications, and skill of the employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange among
employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of production process;
(8) common supervision and determination oflabor-relations policy; (9) relationship to the
administrative organization of the employer; (to) history of collective bargaining;
(11) desires of affected employees; (12) extent of union organization. See A. Cox, D. BOK
& R. GORMAN, CASES & MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 300 (8th ed. 1977); R. GORMAN,
supra note 3. The Board enunciated the community of interest test in Continental Baking
Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 998 (1942).
The Act gives little guidance to the Board for determining an appropriate unit. 29
U.S.C. § 159(b), sets out the general policy of unit determinations. The Act places restric
tions on the Board's discretion. 29 U.S.c. § 159(b)(1) (unit including both professional and
non-professional employees inappropriate unless professionals vote for inclusion, Leedom
v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Sonotone Corp., 90 N.L.R.B. 1236, 26 L.R.R.M. 1354
(1950»; 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (forbids Board to find craft unit inappropriate solely because
of Board precedent finding industrial unit, unless craft employees opt for inclusion, Globe
Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, 21 L.R.R.M. 337 (1937»; 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3)
(exclusion of guards); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5) (extent of employee organization not control
ling).
Consent elections do not produce opinions by regional boards regarding the appropri
ateness of the unit, but directed elections do. The hospital industry has tended to oppose
unionization vigorously. Cain, Becker, McGaughlin & Schwenk, The Effect of Unions on
Wages in Hospitals, 4 RES. LAB. EcON. 191, 194 (1984). Thus, consent elections are rare.
Voluntary recognition is "nonexistent" in the hospital industry; Becker & Miller, supra
note 13, at 313. Thus, a fair number of written decisions on bargaining unit determinations
in health care institutions exist.
28. "Potential craft and departmental units abound in health care institutions. There
are more than 238 separate job classifications in use in health care institutions and these
classifications are commonly grouped into large numbers of separate departments."
Bumpass, supra note 24, at 880 n.72 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, JOB DESCRIPTIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS FOR HOSPITALS AND RELATED HEALTH SERVICES 2, 15
(rev. ed. 1971».
29. S. GOLDSMITH, MODERN HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT 141-42 (1984).
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different degrees and educational backgrounds; to be licensed or certi
fied by different bodies; and have separate professional organizations.
Craftspeople can range from carpenters, electricians, and plumbers to
audio-visual technicians and CAT scanner repairers. 3o Even apart
from direct patient care departments, there are medical records de
partments, food service, laundry, and grounds crews; anyone of these
departments might be eligible for separate representation. 31
This type of fragmentation of the workforce into multiple sepa
rate bargaining units was of major concern to the legislators consider
ing the 1974 amendments.32 Reference was made to the construction
industry during the debate on the amendments. 33 In that industry,
various groups of tradespeople such as carpenters, masons, and electri
cians routinely are found to constitute separate bargaining units enti
tled to separate representation. A contractor might have agreements
with a dozen different unions, each having different wage rates, work
rules, and grievance procedures. A strike, for whatever reason, by one
of these unions might idle many other tradespeople and perhaps halt
construction completely. While the costs and delays resulting from
such strikes may be inconvenient but perhaps tolerable in the con
struction industry, similar interruptions of the flow of medical services
30. It is possible that many of these groups could qualify for separate representation
under the Mallinckrodt standard. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 64
L.R.R.M. 1011 (1966). Under the Mallinckrodt standard craft units are established where
there can be found a "distinct and homogeneous group of skilled journeymen craftsmen
performing the functions of their craft on a nonrepetitive basis." Id. at 397, 64 L.R.R.M. at
1016.
31. Id. The Board's recent decision in North Arundel Hosp. & Md. Nurses Ass'n,
279 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 11 17,804 (Apr. 16, 1986), illustrates the diversity and depart
mentalization of the ranks of professional employees in modem hospitals. There the Re
gional Director granted a separate bargaining unit to registered nurses, citing as support for
his decision the distinct job responsibilities of RNs and their organization into a separate
department. The Board noted that: "Carried to its logical extreme, the Regional Director's
rationale could result in separate bargaining units for professionals in the pharmacy, physi
cal therapy, radiology/CT/nuclear medicine, laboratory/pathology, patient services, re
spiratory/pulmonary, and social work departments . . . ." Id.
32.
The issue of proliferation of bargaining units in health care institutions
has also greatly concerned me during consideration of legislation in this area.
Hospitals and other types of health care institutions are particularly vulnerable to
a mUltiplicity of bargaining units due to the diversified nature of the medical serv
ices provided patients. If each professional interest and job classification is per
mitted to form a separate bargaining unit, numerous administrative and labor
relations problems become involved in the delivery of health care.
120 CONGo REc. 12,944 (1974) (statement of Sen. Taft).
33. On the issue of unit proliferation, Senator Taft remarked: "The administrative
problems from a practical operation viewpoint and labor relations viewpoint must be con
sidered by the Board on this issue. Health-care institutions must not be permitted to go the
route of other industries, particularly the construction trades, in this regard." Id. at 12,945
(statement of Sen. Taft).
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could endanger individual patients as well as the health of entire com
munities that rely on a strike-bound hospital.
The Senate committee directed the Board to avoid unit prolifera
tion in the health care industry, using the words:
Due consideration should be given by the Board to preventing
proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry. In this
connection, the Committee notes with approval the recent Board
decisions in Four Seasons Nursing Center, 208 NLRB No. 50, 85
LRRM 1093 (1974), and Woodland Park Hospital, 205 NLRB No.
144, 84 LRRM 1075 (1973), as well as the trend toward broader
units enunciated in Extendicare of West Virginia, 204 NLRB No.
170, 83 LRRM 1242 (1973).3
3· By our reference to Extendicare, we do not necessarily approve all of the hold
ings of that decision. 34

However, Congress rejected amendments which would have mandated
by statute a prescribed number of units.35 Congress did not intend to
preclude the Board from relying on its own expertise in determining
appropriate units in the health care industry.36 The 1974 amendments
do not contain any specific reference to bargaining unit structure; nor
do the amendments direct the Board to adopt a particular method of
approach in determining an appropriate unit in the health care
industry.
34. Id. at 12,944 (statement of Sen. Taft) (quoting S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3946,3950; H.R. REP. No.
1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974».
35. S.2292, introduced by Senator Taft, would have placed a four unit cap on the
number of appropriate units in the health care industry. This language was deleted from
the final bill. 120 CONGo REC. 13,561 (1974).
36. Of the language quoted supra at note 33, Senator Taft said: "I believe this is a
sound approach and a constructive compromise, as the Board should be permitted some
flexibility in unit determination cases." 120 CONGo REC. 12,944 (1974) (statement of Sen.
Taft).
Senator Williams stated:
The National Labor Relations Board has shown good judgment in establish
ing appropriate units for the purposes of collective bargaining, particularly in
wrestling with units in newly covered industries. While the Board has, as a rule,
tended to avoid unnecessary proliferation of collective bargaining units among
nonsupervisory employees, particularly when there is such a history in the area or
a notable disparity of interests between employees in different job classifications.
While the committee clearly intends that the Board give due consideration to
its admonition to avoid an undue proliferation of units in the health care industry,
it did not within this framework intend to preclude the Board acting in the public
interest from exercising its specialized experience and expert knowledge in deter
mining appropriate bargaining units.
120 CONGo REC. 22,949 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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Unit determinations based on substantial evidence are "rarely to
be disturbed."37 However, several courts of appeals have been willing
to overturn unit determinations in the health care industry.38 The rea
son commonly cited for this lack of deference to the agency's expertise
is that the Board has not followed properly the Congressional admoni
tion and instead has allowed proliferation of units within hospitals and
other health care institutions. 39
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found in the legislative his
tory of the 1974 amendments a mandate for the adoption of a disparity
of interests test. 40 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished
this test from the Board's community of interest approach, which the
court characterized as starting with a narrow unit and adding employ
ees with shared interests. 41 An approach which comports with the
congressional admonition, the court contended, would begin with the
broadest unit possible and would narrow it by excluding employees
with interests disparate from this group.42 In Allegheny General Hos
pital v. NLRB 43 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressed its im
37. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (l946).
38. "Overturn" is perhaps imprecise here. The reviewing court actually denies en
forcement of a Board bargaining order based on what it considers to be an inappropriate
unit determination, in effect overturning the Board's decision. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fredrick
Memorial Hosp., 691 F.2d 191 (4th Cir. 1982); Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v.
NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (lOth Cir. 1981); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d
Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Mercy Hosp. Ass'n., 606 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. St. Francis
Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570
F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1978).
39. See, e.g., Mary Thompson Hasp., 621 F.2d at 861; Mercy Hasp. Ass'n., 606 F.2d
at 28; West Suburban Hasp., 570 F.2d at 216.
40. St. Francis Hosp. ofLynwood, 601 F.2d at 419. The court found that the legisla
tive history of the 1974 amendments:
[R]equir[ed] the Board to determine not the similarities among employees in the
same job classification (indeed the fact that they share the same classification
would inevitably lead to the discovery of many similarities), but instead the "dis
parity of interests" among employee classifications which prevent a combination
of groups of employees into a single broader unit thereby minimizing unit
proliferation.
Id.
41. Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center, 653 F.2d at 457-58.
42. Id. The St. Francis II majority specifically declined to adopt the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals' "rigid" disparity of interests test, and agreed with the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals' analysis in Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. N.L.R.B., 711 F.2d 848, 850
(1983), that such a test would "always require the Board to select the largest appropriate
bargaining unit." St. Francis 11,271 N.L.R.B. at 950, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470. The majority
rejected this "per se" approach for a more "flexible" disparity of interests test along the
lines advocated by the Ninth Circuit.
43. 608 F.2d 965 (3rd Cir. 1979).
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patience with the Board's adherence to the community of interest
standard:
This petition for review of an order of the [Board] requires us to
review the actions of an agency that declines to follow our prece
dent while conceding applicability of that precedent. We hold that
the NLRB must respect the applicable decisions of this court, and
therefore we grant the [Hospital's] petition for review and deny the
Board's cross-petition for enforcement. 44

Not all the circuit courts of appeals have agreed with the Ninth
Circuit's reading of the legislative history of the 1974 amendments.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found no legislative
history to support a disparity of interests test45 and the Second Circuit
disregarded the test proposed by other courts of appeals, stating that it
was balancing the "employees' rights to exercise section 7 rights with
the congressional admonition against unit proliferation."46 The D.C.
Circuit has recently held that: "The 1974 Amendments in no way
require the Board to apply a disparity-of-interest standard when deter
mining appropriate bargaining units in nonprofit health-care institu
tions."47 Both views of the legislative history enjoy support from
commentators. 48 Attorney Michael Stapp has argued that the dispute
44. Id. at 966, quoted in Curley, Health Care Unit Determinations: The Board Ig
nores the Mandate of Congress and the Courts of Appeals, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 103, 112
(1984). See also Husband, Determining Appropriate Units in Health Care Institutions-The
Gap Widens, 32 LAB. L.J. 780 (1981).
45. NLRB v. Walker County Medical Center, 722 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1984).
46. Trustees of Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 626, 633 (2d Cir.
1983).
47. IBEW v. NLRB, No. 85-1642 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 1987) [hereinafter St. Francis
III). On August 28, 1984, shortly after suffering reversal in St. Francis II, the IBEW re
quested the Board to withdraw its remand of the case and enter a final order disposing of
the unfair labor practice charge. On June 26, 1985 the Board dismissed the complaint in
the unfair labor practice proceedings and cleared the way for an appeal. In St. Francis III,
Judge Edwards stated that the Board in St. Francis II had considered the disparity of
interest test mandated by the 1974 Amendments. The D.C. Circuit unanimously disagreed,
however, finding that "in adopting the disparity-of-interests standard, the Board ignored
fundamental principles of statutory interpretation.' Id. at 27. Because the Board's decision
was based on an erroneous view of the law, the court, mindful of SEC v. Chenery, re
manded without expressing an opinion on the proper outcome of the case. Id. at 4-5. The
court did not rule on whether or not the Board could adopt the disparity of interest stan
dard as a matter of policy under the discretionary power granted it by section 9 of the Act.
48. See, e.g., Curley, supra note 44; Dyleski-Najjar, Professional Unions in the Health
Care Industry: The Impact ofSt. Francis II and North Shore University Hospital, 17 LoY.
U. CHI. L.J. 383 (1986) (urging the disparity of interests test); Note, The Nonproliferation
Mandate and the Appropriate Legal Standard in Health Care Bargaining Unit Determina
tions, 11 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 663 (1983). But see Stapp, Ten Years After: A Legal
Framework of Collective Bargaining in the Hospital Industry, 2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 63
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between the Board and some of the appeals courts was a result of
"philosophical differences regarding the relative status of the commu
nity of interest test and the unit proliferation issue. "49 The Board had
felt it necessary to strike a balance between the employees' right to a
bargaining unit based on this test and the congressional admonition. so
Attorney Michael Curley has contended that the disparity of interests
test will result in fewer units in health care institutionss1 and thus
comports with the congressional intent that a more restrictive ap
proach be taken toward health care unit determinations. 52 Accord
ingly, Curley has characterized the Board's approach prior to St.
Francis II as "flawed. "53
The Board ultimately adopted a disparity of interests test in St.
Francis II.54 The next section examines this test more closely and dis
cusses its suitability for resolving conflict in the health care industry.
C.

The Board Adopts the Disparity of Interests Test
1. St. Francis I

On September 28, 1979, the International Brotherhood of Electri
cal Workers (IBEW) Local 474 filed a petition with the NLRB to hold
a representation election for a group of skilled maintenance employees
at St. Francis Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. On November 19,
1979, the employer requested review of the Regional Director's unit
determination decision. On December 4, 1979, the National Labor
Relations Board granted the employer's request for review. The
Board rendered its decision upholding the Regional Director's deci
sion on December 16, 1982 (St. Francis 1).55
(1984); contra Comment, Bargaining Unit Determinations in the Health Care Industry

The Gospel According to St. Francis II, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 67 (1985)
49. Stapp, supra note 48, at 76.
50. Id.
51. Curley, supra note 44, at 121.
52. Id. at 122.
53. Id. at 121.
54. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471. See infra note 68-71

and accompanying text.
55. On November 5, 1979, the Regional Director (Region 26) found an appropriate
unit of maintenance employees including more job classifications than the unit requested by
the union, but far fewer than the employer's request for a unit of all service and mainte
nance employees at the hospital. The employer filed a request for review of the Regional
Director's decision and the National Labor Relations Board granted that request on De
cember 4,1979. At the close of balloting of the subsequent directed election (December 7,
1979), the Board impounded the ballot box.
Two years later, on December 16, 1982, the NLRB issued its decision (St. Francis 1)
on the employer's request for review of the Regional Director's unit determination deci
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St. Francis 1 56 explicated the "two-step" analysis used to resolve
unit determinations in health care institutions. First, the Board estab
lishes seven "potentially" (but not presumptively) appropriate units. 57
If the unit requested by the petitioning employees does not match the
definition of one of these units, it is "presumptively" inappropriate and
the petition is dismissed. This caps the number of appropriate units for
health care institutions. 58 If the unit petitioned for survives this step,
the Board's second step is to consider arguments based on the specific
characteristics of the particular institution to determine whether the
petitioning employees share a sufficient community of interest to be
granted a separate bargaining unit. 59 The Board does not impose auto
matically the seven unit scheme on a particular health care institution.
If the organizational make-up of a particular enterprise is such that
splitting the employees into one or more of these units would be artifi
cial or inappropriate, a separate unit would not be granted. Thus, an
enterprise should have no more than seven appropriate units and, de
sion and direction of election. The Board agreed with the Regional Director's decision
finding the unit in which the election was held to be appropriate for bargaining. The Board
opened the impounded ba\1ot box on January 5, 1983, and certified IBEW Local 474 as the
exclusive co\1ective bargaining agent for the employees in the unit.
On January 17, 1983, in response to a request by the union to open negotiations, the
employer, in writing, refused to recognize or bargain with the union. On January 21, the
union filed 8(a)(I) and 8(a)(5) (failure to bargain) charges against the employer. The em
ployer defended the ensuing summary judgment motion by maintaining that the unit as
found by the Regional Director and approved on review by the fu\1 Board was inappropri
ate. Although parties are not a\1owed to raise as a defense and re-litigate issues which were
litigated in a prior representation hearing, the Board, sua sponte, decided to reconsider its
decision in St. Francis I.
56. St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. 1025, 112 L.R.R.M. 1153.
57. Id. at 1031, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1160.
We begin with a maximum of seven potentially appropriate units, derived through
our 8 years' experience with the industry: physicians, registered nurses, other pro
fessionals, technical employees, business office clerical employees, service and
maintenance employees, and maintenance employees. These units are neither pre
sumptively appropriate nor will they invariably be granted. They are, rather,
commonly found employee groups which may warrant their own bargaining units

Id. (emphasis in original).
58. One commentator contends that the majority's "cap" is ineffective.
Yet, under the fo\1owing circumstances, this figure could be inflated beyond seven
units: (I) a separate guard unit pursuant to statutory requirement; (2) where a
prior bargaining relationship existed with an employee group which does not con
form to one of the seven basic units; (3) a stipulation of the parties; (4) unit ap
proval due to comity; or (5) some other "extraordinary circumstance."
Note, supra note 47, at 681-82 (footnotes omitted). The St. Francis I majority claimed,
however, that "additional unit" cases would be rare, St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1032,
112 L.R.R.M. at 1160.
59. St. Francis I, 265 N.L.R.B. at 1029, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
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pending on local factors, might have fewer. In this way, the Board
applies the congressional admonition by factoring it into the first step
of the analysis.
The majority said that St. Francis I explained the approach the
Board had used implicitly since 1974 in determining appropriate bar
gaining units in the health care industry.60 The courts of appeals may
have misunderstood the Board's processes if they have assumed the
Board has applied only the community of interests test, without more,
to the health care industry.61 The Board has not merely genuflected to
the congressional admonition against undue proliferation of bargain
ing units. The majority believed that its approach implemented the
congressional admonition and struck the appropriate balance between
proliferation of units and the employees' right to organize. 62

2. St. Francis II
But if St. Francis I was in some way the "culmination" of this line
of analysis, it was also its demise. Indeed, the Board never utilized St.
Francis 1.63 Despite a sizable backlog of cases64 the Board did not
issue a decision in a unit determination case in the health care industry
for a year and a half.65 Instead, the Board, on its own initiative, recon
sidered St. Francis I, overruling it in August of 1984. 66
The majority in St. Francis II acknowledged that the Board's in
terpretation of the Congressional admonition against proliferation of
bargaining units in health care institutions was at odds with the deci
sions of several of the courts of appeals. 67 The Board turned from the
traditional community of interests standard and adopted a unique dis
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1031, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1160.
62. Id. at 1029-30, 112 L.R.R.M. at 1158-60.
63. "My colleagues in the majority have successfully prevented that case and any
case relying on it from seeing the light of day. As of today, the St. Francis I standard has
never received a full review in any court of appeals." St. Francis Hosp. & IBEW, 271
N.L.R.B. 948, 955, 116 L.R.R.M. 1465, 1472 (1984) (Member Zimmerman dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
64. Member Zimmerman noted in January of 1981, almost two years prior to the
decision in St. Francis I, that the Board was "fully aware of the large number of cases
awaiting decision on this issue" (health care unit determinations), and promised that the
Board would "endeavor to reach it with something greater than all deliberate speed." Zim
merman, Trends in NLRB Health Care Industry Decisions, 32 LAB. L.J. 3, 7 (1981).
65. By the time St. Francis II issued, the Board had a backlog of some 80 cases; the
largest single category of backlogged cases. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 955 n.3, 116
L.R.R.M. at 1472 n.3 (Member Zimmerman dissenting).
66. See supra note 55.
67. St. Francis II, 271 N.L.R.B. at 952, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1469.
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parity of interests standard for health care unit determinations. 68
Under the disparity of interests test, the Board subjected the unit peti
tioned for by the employees to heightened scrutiny,69 requiring a find
ing of sharper than usual differences between the petitioning
employees and the non-petitioning employees in order for the unit to
be appropriate. 70 This is a different and more rigorous standard than
the Board uses in any other industry.71

II.

POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE DISPARITY OF INTERESTS TEST

In St. Francis II, the majority clearly stated the logical and statu
tory underpinnings of its position. First, "Congress concluded that
the object of minimizing work stoppages resulting from initial organi
zational activities, jurisdictional disputes, and sympathy strikes could
best be achieved, and thus the likelihood of disruptions to health care
reduced, by minimizing the number of units appropriate in the health
care industry."72 Second, the Board declared that applying the dispar
ity of interests test to unit determinations in the health care industry
"must necessarily result in fewer units and will thus reflect meaning
ful application of the congressional injunction against unit
fragmentation. "73
The important social goal of providing health care services unin
terrupted by labor disputes must be balanced against another impor
tant goal; protecting the employees' rights to organize and bargain
collectively. These rights are embodied in Section 1 of the Wagner
Act7 4 and reiterated in the legislative history of the 1974 health care
amendments. 75 The failure to provide a mechanism for the exercise of
these rights may bring about results which are antithetical to the ac
companying goal of assuring uninterrupted health care services. 76
68.

Id. at 954, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470.
Id.
That is to say, the appropriateness of the petitioned-for unit is judged in terms of
normal criteria, but sharper than usual differences (or "disparities") between the
wages, hOUTS, and working conditions, etc. of the requested employees and those
in an overall professional or nonprofessional unit must be established to grant the
unit.
Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 951, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470.
72. Id. at 950-51, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
73. Id. at 953, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1470.
74. See infra note 13.
75. S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CoDE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 3946.
76. "The Board seems to be ignoring the fact that if employees in the hospital indus
69.
70.
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Many American labor leaders have predicted that health care employ
ees may resort to such extra-legal tactics if they are systematically
frustrated by the Board's policyJ7
But the disparity of interests test may result in units of such size
and heterogeneity that employees would not, in the overwhelming ma
jority of cases, be able to organize successfully. Even if the employees
were able to win a representation election, the heterogeneity of the
unit could prove an obstacle to achievement of their collective bargain
ing goals. Such results would be antithetical to the twin goals of the
1974 amendments.
Non-proliferation of units is a tool for minimizing work stoppages
and the resultant disruption in the flow of health care services. Used
in conjunction with the other special provisions of the Act which ap
ply to health care employees,78 this tool should bring about a proper
balance of the "twin goals." However, the Board should not use non
proliferation to prevent health care employees from organizing them
selves into unions on the pretext of preventing work stoppages and
disruptions to the delivery of health care services. In adopting the
disparity of interests test, the Board should not achieve the proper,
desired goal of minimizing work stoppages by the use of an improper,
undesirable means; specifically, preventing health care employees from
organizing.
A.

Effect of Unit Size on the Outcome of Representation Elections

The NLRB does not employ economists, industrial sociologists,
or other like professionals to engage in empirical research and inform
its decisionmaking process. 79 It has no yardstick against which to
try are not afforded adequate employment rights under the law, they will exercise those
rights regardless of the law. This is a consideration which at least implicitly underlies all
labor legislation." Stapp, supra note 48, at 71 n.65.
77. See Remarks by John Sweeny (Service Employees Internation Union), Henry
Nicholas (National Union of Hospital & Health Care Employees), Robert Muehlenkamp
(NUHHCE), and Candice Owley (Federation of Nurses & Health Professionals-Ameri
can Federation of Teachers) testifying before the House Subcommittee on Labor-Manage
ment Relations and on Manpower and Housing, October 3, 1984 as reported in 56 WHITE
COLLAR REP. (BNA) No. 14, at 414 (Oct. 10, 1984). See also Address by Eileen Mc
Manus, A Union Perspective on Health Care Bargaining Units, before the Association of
Labor Relations Agencies Conference (July 25, 1985).
78. See infra notes 108-22, and accompanying text.
79. "Nothing in this subchapter shaH be construed to authorize the Board to appoint
individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis." 29
U.S.c. § I 54(a) (1982). This has not always been the case. For an account of the early role
of the Economics Division of the NLRB, see J. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (1979). For an account of the Division's decline and demise
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measure the results of the policies it adopts in the course of individual
adjudications. It cannot present its statutory and precedential argu
ments to the courts of appeals buttressed with data which would pre
dict what results will flow from the adoption or rejection of particular
policies. Neither has the Board engaged in any type of rulemaking,
informal or formal, in its over fifty year history.80 When courts defer
to Board decisions, they are merely yielding to the collective experi
ence of the Board members in the area of labor relations and their
familiarity with the NLRA and Board precedent.
The Board's adoption in St. Francis II of the "disparity of inter
ests" test is a fundamental break in the way it has interpreted the
health care amendments since their enactment in 1974. Prior to St.
Francis II, the Board relied on the community of interest test used in
other industries, modified by the congressional admonition against
proliferation of bargaining units in health care institutions. 81 The
logic of this approach, or at least the articulation of the premises, ap
peared to culminate in the "two-tiered" scheme espoused by the ma
jority in St. Francis I. Several courts of appeals recommended the
disparity of interests test as the correct way to implement the congres
sional admonition against proliferation of bargaining units in the
health care industry.82 However, neither the courts nor the Board
thoroughly considered the effect of the disparity of interests test on
industry employees and their rights to organize. 83
One truth on which both academics and practitioners of labor
during the McCarthy period, see J. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD (1981) [hereinafter RESHAPING THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD]. The Board does compile statistics on its internal procedures and the various peti
tions on which it acts. Those statistics often provide the raw material for studies by in
dependent academics.
80. One explanation suggested for the NLRB's preference for using adjudication
rather than rulemaking is that adjudication is less likely to expose the Board to the political
controversy which a rulemaking procedure would engender. Political pressures would be
great considering the powerful interested constituencies involved. See Note, NLRB
Rulemaking: Political Reality Versus Procedural Fairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982 (1980). How
ever, both Member Zimmerman in his dissent in St. Francis II and Member Dennis in her
concurrence called for rulemaking on the issue of bargaining units in the health care indus
try. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
83. In St. Francis III, Judge Edwards noted that the thrust of the Board's decision in
St. Francis II was based on the erroneous assumption that the disparity of interests test was
mandated by the 1974 amendments. As a result, the Board "made no attempt to justify its
disparity-of-interests standard as a reasonable interpretation of section 9 of the Act . . .
[the Board adopted the disparity of interest test] either without regard to the standards
enunciated in section 9 or as a supervening standard for employees in the health-care indus
try." IBEW v. NLRB, No. 85-1642, 25 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 20, 1987).
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relations certainly agree is that the Board's unit determination deci
sion has a profound effect on employer-employee relations in a given
enterprise. As a Brookings Institute study noted over fifteen years
ago:
Unit determination plays a large role in both the private and public
sectors in influencing which, if any, union will be chosen as a bar
gaining representative, the power structure of bargaining, the ability
of various groups of employees to affect directly the terms and con
ditions of their employment, and the peacefulness and effectiveness
of the bargaining relationship. 84

The average acute care hospital has a large number of employees
who potentially are eligible for a "professional" unit under either St.
Francis I or St. Francis II. Typically, the largest single group is regis
tered nurses. 8S If a single group of these employees, such as registered
nurses, is not able to demonstrate a disparity of interests from the
other professional employees 86 under St. Francis II they likely will be
lumped together in a single election unit. 87 In Keokuk Area Hospital
84. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1971). See also
Rose, supra note 3; Another view of Union Organizing, supra note 3.
85. This note uses registered nurses as an example of a contiguous, recognizable
group of health care professionals.
86. Former Chairman Van De Water considered the disparity of interests test to
entail two appropriate units for health care institutions, all professionals and all non-profes
sionals. The burden would be on the petitioning employees (e.g. registered nurses) who
would be granted a more limited unit "but only where it is clearly established that the
employees in the proposed unit have a notable disparity of interest from employees in the
larger unit which would prohibit or inhibit fair representation for them if they were denied
separate representation." St. Francis Hosp. & IBEW, 265 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1040, 112
L.R.R.M. 1153, 1167 (1984) (Chairman Van De Water dissenting).
See NLRB v. HMO Int'l, 678 F.2d 806, 812 n.17 (9th Cir. 1982); Presbyterian/St.
Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. St. Francis
Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Stapp, supra note 48, at 75 (The
conclusion that the petitioner must bear the burden of demonstrating why the smaller unit
is appropriate stems from the premise that the employee's community of interest is
subordinate to the admonition against unit proliferation.).
87. This note does not attempt to give an exhaustive account of regional directors'
decisions on appropriate bargaining units after St. Francis II. It is too early to predict what
factors must be present and in what quantities to constitute a "disparity." However, a
sampling of initial interpretations of St. Francis II by regional directors sheds some light.
In January 1986, the Regional Director vacated an April 2, 1980, election held in a unit of
engineering employees at the Community Hospital of Glen Cove, N.Y. The Director found
that the hospital's 1,100 employees could be grouped into three units: finance, medical, and
service and maintenance. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, NLRB 29-RC-4833 (Jan. 17,
1986). In Doctors Hosp. of Montclair & Local 1428 of the United Food & Commercial
Workers, NLRB 31-RC-4837 (Jan. 24, 1985), Regional Director Roger Goubeaux re
opened the case of a union that had been certified in 1981 to represent medical technicians,
pharmacists, and registered dieticians. Goubeaux revoked certification and ruled that the
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and Iowa Nurses Association,88 the Regional Director certified an all
RN unit in 1980. The employer refused to bargain and on August 27,
1984, the National Labor Relations Board remanded the case for fur
ther consideration consistent with St. Francis II. On January 11, 1985,
the Regional Director revoked certification of the union and directed
an election in an all professional unit. The National Board unani
mously approved this unit determination on January 27, 1986. 89 In
the recent case of North Arundel Hospital and Maryland Nurses Asso
ciation,9o the Regional Director approved the all-RN unit requested by
the petitioner. He did so even after reconsideration based on the dis
parity of interests test set forth in St. Francis II. The National Board
unanimously reversed, finding that "the smallest appropriate unit for
bargaining must be an overall professional unit."91 On December 29,
1986, in Middletown Hospital Association and Ohio Nurses Associa
tion,92 the Board unanimously affirmed an administrative law judge's
decision, made on the basis of St. Francis II, that an RN only unit at
Middletown Hospital was not appropriate. The Board expressed ap
proval that the ALJ's decision was "premised largely on factors other
than the degree of functional integration between the two groups, such
as similarity of pay and benefits and centralized labor relations and
personnel policies. "93
It is manifestly difficult to organize such an overall professional
unit. The difficulties stem from the divergent characteristics of the
sub-groups comprising the overall professional unit. For example,
many employees do not know each other or even see each other at
their place of employment. Further, some sub-groups are physically
isolated from each other, and some employees are involved in direct
patient care while others never see a patient. It is difficult for a bar
gaining agent to meld an effective organizing committee from such a
disparate group. The fact that these employees have widely varied
professional and employment goals discourages consensus on the
unit was inappropriate because it did not include registered nurses. Director Robert Fuchs
found a unit of all RNs at Calais, Maine, Regional Hospital appropriate in May of 1983;
but on December 7, 1984 he issued a supplemental decision finding that, after St. Francis
II, only an all professional unit was appropriate. Calais Regional Hosp. & Me. State
Nurses Ass'n, NLRB I-RC-17,830 (Dec. 7, 1984).
88. 278 N.L.R.B. No. 33 (Jan. 27, 1986).
89. Id.
90. NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 17,804 (Apr. 16, 1986).
91. Id.
92. 282 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (Dec. 29, 1986). The Ohio Nurses Association has filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. No decision has
been handed down as of the time of this writing.
93. Id.
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changes to be made in their work-life through collective bargaining,
the ultimate end of the organizing effort.
Professor Gorman has stated that union organizers prefer
smaller, more homogeneous units while management usually prefers a
larger, more heterogeneous unit for election purposes. 94 This observa
tion, albeit correct, may mask a more significant variable in the labor
relations equation. A recent study conducted by Professor John
Thomas Delaney, Union Success in Hospital Representation Elec
tions,95 examines what factors affected the outcome of representation
elections in hospitals. After considering political, social, and eco
nomic variables which might affect elections, Professor Delaney found
that the factor which correlates most strongly with the success or fail
ure of union organizing efforts is unit size.
These data suggest that NLRB administrative decisions signifi
cantly affect the results of representation elections in hospitals. For
instance, if the Board recognizes small, specialized hospital units,
unions seem to benefit. Conversely, if the Board favors large or
broad units, hospitals seem to benefit. In general, the nature of the
bargaining unit and elections process may be more important deter
minants of union success in elections than environmental or hospital
factors. 96

Thus, when the Board adopts a test which it knows will result in
larger bargaining units, the Board should realize that, at the same
time, it is making it more difficult for employees to organize and win
certification elections. To this extent, the Board may be frustrating
the goal of fostering collective bargaining in an effort to prevent undue
proliferation.
B.

Effect of Occupational Heterogeneity on Collective Bargaining
and Election Outcomes

Research indicates that "traditional" economic issues (e.g. wages
and pensions) are not the prime motivating factors behind the or
ganizing efforts of health care professionals. 97 Not surprisingly, the
94. R. GORMAN, supra note 3, at 68; Curley, supra note 44.
95. Delaney, supra note 14. See also Becker & Miller, supra note 13.
96. Delaney, supra note 14, at 159 (emphasis added).
97. A recent report issued by the American Hospital Association indicates that U.S.
health professionals share these goals. The report says that the list of professional concerns
and organizing issues shared by professional and white collar health care employees include
quality of care, quality of work, stress, job restructuring, and adequate staffing. Organizing
in Health Care Industry Exepected to Increase in. Coming Years, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 15 (Jan. 23, 1987).
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bargaining goals of RNs also do not center on economic issues. 98
"Professional issues" such as staffing (nurse/patient ratio), availability
of future professional educational opportunities, in-service instruction,
and better equipment rank high on the list of negotiating priorities. 99
Although there is little comprehensive research available in the United
States, Professor Allen M. Ponak conducted a revealing study on the
collective bargaining goals of Canadian RNs.1OO The study tested two
hypotheses: that RNs distinguished professional goals from "tradi
tional" bargaining goals; and that they attached priority to those pro
fessional goals in negotiations. The results of the study "indicated not
merely that professional bargaining goals were important but that they
were more important, than traditional bargaining goals . . . ."101
Other studies indicate that when employees with different professional
goals are required to engage in a common collective bargaining pro
cess, the professional goals of both groups are submerged in favor of
economic objectives, which are the only types of issues that allow a
consensus to emerge. 102 Lacking consensus, the employees also lack
the bargaining strength to enforce their demands on management.
Two inferences regarding the future behavior of RNs can be
made from the above research. First, RNs will be less likely to exer
cise their right to organize (and risk possible repercussions from man
agement) if they are included in units with professional employees that
do not share their employment goals. The RNs will realize at the out
set of the organizing process that it is unlikely that their professional
concerns will muster strong support from other medical professionals
such as laboratory technologists or pharmacists, much less non-medi
98. A 1981 study of unionism in the health care industry noted that "RNs dominate
union activity among professional workers," and that: "Their principal interest and fre
quent source of conflicts with management has been in the nonwage area, particularly staff
ing levels and assignments." Cain, Becker, McLaughlin & Schwenk, supra note 27, at 309.
99. See supra note 97.
100. Ponak, Unionized Professionals and the Scope ofBargaining: A Study ofNurses,
34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 396 (1981).
101. Id. at 406 (emphasis added). See also Bruggink, Finan, Gendel & Todd, Direct
and Indirect Effects of Unionization on the Wage Levels of Nurses: A Case Study of New
Jersey Hospitals, 6 J. LAB. RES. 381 (1985). "Even though RN's in teaching hospitals have
higher work requirements, the coefficient for the teaching hospital dummy is statistically
insignificant. Apparently, no additional wage rewards are required for the increased work
effort." Id. at 413. An uncontrolled but nonetheless interesting sampling was taken by RN
Magazine on the issue of nurses and unionization. On the issue of what bargaining goals
nurses would like to see unions address, the results of this survey correlate strongly with
the trend suggested by the studies cited above. See Lee, A Wary New Welcome for Unions,
RN, Nov. 1982, at 35-40.
102. Perry & Angle, Bargaining Unit Structure and Organizational Outcomes, 20
INDUS. REL. 47 (1981); Cain, Becker, McLaughlin & Schwenk, supra note 27.

ST. FRANCIS II

19871

323

cal professionals. In turn, this will make achievement of these goals at
the bargaining table less likely. With the end product of the organiz
ing effort-the right to engage in collective bargaining-seen as an
inefficient vehicle for the achievement of these professional goals at the
heart of their employment concerns, RNs will be far less likely to en
gage in the time consuming and risky business of union organizing.
Even if professional employees are successful in organizing them
selves into these heterogeneous bargaining units, the units' very heter
ogeneity may force a sUbjugation of those professional and
employment goals of greatest concern to RNs in favor of the "com
mon ground" issues of wages, pensions, health benefits, and the like. 103
This is hardly the goal which the Board sets out to achieve in unit
determinations, viz., a unit which assures employees the fullest free
dom in exercising the rights guaranteed by the Act. 104
The Board should reconsider whether the disparity of interests
test strikes the proper balance. Even if some employees are able to
organize, the fruits of collective bargaining may be denied them in
contradiction to the purpose of the 1974 amendments.
III.

Is THE ADOPTION OF THE DISPARITY OF
INTERESTS TEST NECESSARY?

Non-proliferation of bargaining units is not an end in itself. It is a
means of minimizing work stoppages which interrupt provision of
health care services. In the words of the St. Francis II majority, the
disruptions said to flow from undue proliferation of bargaining units
are "work stoppages resulting from initial organizing activities, juris
dictional disputes, and sympathy strikes."105 This section of the note
examines each in turn.
It is far from clear why work stoppages should result from initial
organizing activities within health care institutions more frequently in
smaller units than in larger ones. Since the enactment of the 1974
amendments, recognition strikes in the health care industry, never a
common occurrence, have been even more rare.106 Health care em
ployees are, generally, less likely to strike to gain recognition when
103. See generally Perry & Angle, supra note 100; Cain, Becker, McLaughlin &
Schwenk, supra note 27. See also Ponak, supra note 100.
104. 29 U.S.c. § IS9(b) (1982).
105. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
106. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations
and on Manpower and Housing on October 10, 1984, Executive Vice-President of the Na
tional Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, Bob Muehlenkamp, stated that in
the ten years since the enactment of the 1974 amendments, his 100,000+ member union
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they are presented with a peaceful, legal alternative. 107
Unlike other private sector employees who may begin organiza
tional picketing and strike activity at any time, Section 8(g) of the Act,
added by the 1974 amendments, requires labor organizations to give
notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service ten days
prior to engaging in picketing, strikes, or other concerted work stop
pages at health care facilities. lOS Employees whose labor organizations
do not comply with the notice provisions of Section 8(g) lose the pro
tection of the Act. 109 Section 8(b)(7)(C) requires that a union which is
picketing for recognition file for an election "within a reasonable pe
riod not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of the picket
ing,"110 and that the Board move expeditiously to determine the
appropriate unit and direct an election. I I I Given these statutory con
straints and the paucity of recognitional strike activity since enactment
has been involved in only four recognition strikes. 56 WHITE COLLAR REP. (BNA) 415
(Oct. 10, 1984).
107.
Although there have been hospital strikes in some areas of the country,
they are rare. One of the local organizers for the Service Employees International
Union indicated to me that the main force working against using the strike
weapon is the employees themselves. As he put it, "Getting them to join the
union was difficult, but getting them to strike would be impossible-they identify
with the patients and their critical place in the hospital organization."
T. BAROCCI, NON-PROFIT HOSPITALS 151 (1981). See also Cain, Becker, McGaughlin &
Schwenk, supra note 27, at 193; Lee, supra note 101, at 35-40 (poll shows many RNs
opposed to striking).
108.
A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other
concerted refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not less than ten
days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal Media
tion and Conciliation Service of that intention .... The notice shall state the date
and time that such action will commence.
29 U.S.c. § 158(g) (1982).
109. "Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in
subsection, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsec
tion (g) of this section, shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the
particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act ...." 29
U.S.c. § 158(d) (1982).
110. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982). But it was the intent of the Senate to shorten
the period in the case of recognitional picketing at a health care institution.
In recognition picketing cases under Section 8(b)(7)(C), the National Labor
Relations Board has ruled that a reasonable period of time is thirty days absent
unusual circumstances such as violence or intimidation. It is the sense of the
Committee that picketing of a health care institution would in itself constitute an
unusual circumstance justifying the application of a period of time less than thirty
days.
S. REP. No. 766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. I, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS 3946, 3951.
111.
[W]hen such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without
regard to the provisions of section 159(c)(I) of this title or the absence ofa show
ing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an elec
tion in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results
thereof ....
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of the amendments, increasing the size of bargaining units probably
will not reduce the already minimal number of such disruptions. On
the contrary, labor leaders warn that the frustration caused by Board
policy on unit determinations in the health care industry may lead to
such disruptions by encouraging employees to bypass Board
procedures. 112
On the issue of jurisdictional disputes, congressional concern is
well-meaning, but it appears misplaced. Health care institutions em
ploy a broad spectrum of professionals, technicians, and tradespeople,
and generally have a ramified structure of job classifications and re
sponsibilities. This structure contains the potential for disputes over
allocation of duties between bargaining units. Congress, mindful of
the difficulties which proliferation of bargaining units has caused in
the construction industry, accordingly sought to eliminate this poten
tial source of disruption from the health care industry}13
However, state laws license medical professionals and para-pro
fessionals in the health care field. Health care professionals legally
cannot delegate most of their duties and responsibilities. 114 Nor is it
likely that hospitals would agree to delegation given the increased risk
of error and liability. Engaging in a work stoppage to force an em
ployer to transfer work from one bargaining unit to another would
violate Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act}15 Moreover, the Board has the
29

u.s.c. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1982).

Failure to file a petition within the "reasonable time" specified in 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(7)(C) leaves the union open to an unfair labor practice charge. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1)
(1982) directs the Board to move quickly on such violations: "[T]he preliminary investiga
tion of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases ...."
29 U.S.C. § 160(1). The restraining order shall issue if the court finds "substantial and
irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoidable." Id.
112. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 33.
114. The Board is aware of this feature of the health care industry. Recently, in the
course of reviewing a unit determination, the Board noted:
Moreover, although the Regional Director found little evidence of interchange of
duties or functions between registered nurses and other professionals, it is clear
that this lack of interchange is inherent to (sic) the health care industry because
all of the professional employees-including registered nurses-have received
specialized education and training in their own fields so as to make job in
terchange impossible, or even illegal, where state certification or licensure is
required.
North Arundel Hosp. & Md. Nurses Ass'n, NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1117,804 (April 16, 1986).
115.
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
... to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike ... where ... an object thereof is: (D) forcing or requiring any employer
to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a
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power to expedite settlement of jurisdictional disputes under Section
lO(k),116 and Section 10(1) of the Act. 117 Lastly, the potential threat of
work stoppages caused by jurisdictional disputes simply has not mate
rialized. 118 The adoption of a new test which yields larger and fewer
bargaining units is not needed to ameliorate a problem that does not
exist.
The issue of sympathy strikes similarly has not emerged as a ma
jor problem within the health care industry since the enactment of the
1974 amendments. Here again, analogies to the problem of sympathy
strikes in the construction industry, attributed to proliferation of bar
gaining units, break down. Health care employees do not have the
same degree of union consciousness or solidarity that has developed as
a result of decades of tradition in the construction industry. Rather,
they continue to view their primary mission as service to the patient
and the communityl19 and tend not to honor the picket lines of strik
ing co-workers.120
The notice provisions of the LMRA also apply to non-striking
employees who concertedly refuse to cross the picket lines of other
employees. 121 The few instances of sympathy strikes which have oc
curred typically have been cases of professional employees (RNs) re
fusing to cross the picket lines of striking non-professional employees
(service and maintenance personnel) or vice-versa. By its own terms,
particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organi
zation or in another trade, craft, or class . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(0) (1982).
116. "Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph (4)(0) of section 158(b) of this title, the Board is empow
ered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice
shall have arisen .... " 29 U.S.c. § 160(k) (1982).
117. The Board may obtain a temporary restraining order against work stoppages
caused by jurisdictional disputes. "In situations where such relief is appropriate the proce
dure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 158(b)(4)(0) of this
title." 29 U.S.c. § 160(1) (1982). See supra note 111 for circumstances under which a
restraining order will be granted.
118. Robert Muehlenkamp, Executive Vice-President of the National Union of Hos
pital and Health Care Employees Union testified before the House Subcommittee on La
bor-Management Relations on Manpower and Housing that his union has engaged in 160
strikes since the enactment of the 1974 amendments but that none were a result ofjurisdic
tional disputes. 56 WHITE COLLAR REP. (BNA) 414-15 (Oct. 10, 1984). Statistics are not
available to determine what number of § 160(k) hearings take place specifically in the
health care industry.
119. See supra note 107.
120. "It is highly relevant to note that the occupational groups in hospitals have
often crossed the picket lines of one another." Cain, Becker, McGaughlin & Schwenk,
supra note 27, at 197.
121. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
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the disparity of interests test would not address this problem. 122
Recognitional, jurisdictional, and sympathy work stoppages were
not major problems for the health care industry during the ten years
the Board adhered to its St. Francis I view of the congressional admo
nition against proliferation of bargaining units. Ample means exist
within the Act to deal effectively with whatever sporadic outbreaks of
such activity that occur. Despite the premises articulated by the St.
Francis II majority, the adoption of the disparity of interest test was
not dictated by necessity.
CONCLUSION

Congressional concern over labor relations in the health care in
dustry is valid. This industry must be, and has been, treated differ
ently than other industries in the private sector. Employees must be
constrained in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the NLRA because of the impact on helpless patients and the pub
lic. They must, however, be able to exercise those rights within the
framework of labor legislation. Forcing health care employees to re
sort to economic coercion in order to gain recognition and the free
exercise of collective bargaining would be disastrous.
The St. Francis II majority based adoption of the disparity of in
terests test on its interpretation of the legislative history of the 1974
amendments. In so doing, the majority turned its back on the inter
pretation the Board has held since the enactment of the amend
ments. 123 They did not address the empirical results of the Board's
original interpretation at any point. They did not address the poten
122. See Remarks by Robert Muehlenkamp, Executive Vice-President of the Na
tional Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees testifying before the House Subcom
mittee on Labor-Management Relations on Manpower and Housing, 56 WHITE COLLAR
REP. (BNA) 415 (Oct. 10, 1984).
123. John Fanning, former Board Chairman commented on the Board's reversal of
precedent: "How can we both be following Congressional mandate? ... To have every
decision reversed-we couldn't have been that wrong." 56 WHITE COLLAR REP. (BNA)
253 (Aug. 22, 1984).
However, this is precisely what one commentator, Attorney Debra Dyleski-Najjar,
contends.
From 1974 until 1984, however, the Board applied traditional community
of-interests standards and, contrary to the intent of Congress, certified virtually
every petitioned-for group of health care workers as a separate appropriate unit.
This failure to heed the congressional admonition contributed to an increase in
the number of strikes in the health care industry following the enactment of the
1974 amendments. Thus, it is apparent that the community-of-interests test not
only violated congressional intent, but also resulted in the very end which the
nonproliferation mandate was designed to avoid ....
[T]he Board's prior unit determination findings and the fragmentation of in
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tial effects of the new disparity of interests test at any point. What
remains is a combat of conflicting interpretations of congressional ac
tion; what emerges is a new test which gives little guidance to the
bench and bar.'24
Member Zimmerman stated in his dissent in St. Francis II that
the issue of unit determinations in the health care industry is ripe for
rulemaking. 125 Member Dennis expressed similar views in her concur
ring opinion. 126 The majority declined to exercise the Board's
rulemaking authority. 127
However, the issue of unit determinations in the health care in
dustry presents itself as a strong candidate for breaking with the
terests ... [have] led to strikes in health care institutions over the past twelve
years.
Dyleski-Najjar, supra note 48, at 421 (footnotes omitted). In support of her argument,
Attorney Dyleski-Najjar cites statistics on the number of strikes in health care institutions
between 1974 and 1980, which show a marked increase in both the number of work stop
pages and the number of idle days per year. Id. at 402 n.lO!.
However, Attorney Dyleski-Najjar's chain of logic, that the increased strike activity
was a result of the Board's failure to heed the congressional admonition against unit
proliferation, is highly suspect. An alternative and far more likely explanation is simply
that unionized employees who have the legal right to strike are far more likely to do so than
unorganized employees who do not have that right. In 1974, the baseline year for the study
cited, health care employees across the nation came under the aegis of the National Labor
Relations Act. See supra note 15. Throughout the period in question (1974-1980) tens of
thousands of health care employees joined the ranks of organized labor. Union organizing
activity, union election victories, and, not surprisingly, legal, union-led strikes increased
during that period. It is, of course, legitimate to speculate on what effect the Board's poli
cies may have had on strike activity during that period, but Attorney Dyleski-Najjar's in
ference of a direct correlation overstates the case.
Furthermore, as the St. Francis II majority stated: "Congress concluded that the ob
ject of minimizing work stoppages resulting from initial organizational activities, jurisdic
tional disputes, and sympathy strikes could best be achieved, and thus the likelihood of
disruptions to health care reduced, by minimizing the number of units appropriate in the
health care industry." St. Francis Hosp. & IBEW, 271 N.L.R.B. 948, 950-51, 116
L.R.R.M. 1465, 1468 (1984). Congress did not intend that the nonproliferation mandate
reach and restrict the ability of health care employees to engage in economic strikes; but
rather provided other means to so restrict such activity. 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1982); see also
supra text accompanying note 7!. Unfortunately, the statistics cited by Attorney Dyleski
Najjar do not separate days lost due to economic strikes versus stoppages resulting from
recognition strikes, jurisdictional disputes, and sympathy strikes. Those statistics alone
would yield meaningful and reliable correlations between the Board's unit determination
decisions and the type of disruptions they are designed to curtail.
124. "By today's decision, however, the majority had demonstrated the futility of
this Board's attempts to resolve this issue through traditional case-by-case adjudication.
Rulemaking could provide an acceptable and feasible means to end the lO-year contro
versy." St. Francis 11,271 N.L.R.B. at 958, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1475 (Member Zimmerman,
dissenting).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 955, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1472 (Member Dennis, concurring).
127. Id. at 953 n.39, 116 L.R.R.M. at 1471 n.39.
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Board's "tradition" of avoiding rulemaking. The health care industry
is expanding; more of these issues will arise. During the past twelve
years, adjudication produced a tremendous number of cases concern
ing unit determinations and the disparity of interest test will only con
tinue this trend. 128 Litigation always means delay. In the sphere of
labor relations, delay often translates into the destruction of union ma
jorities, the de facto denial of bargaining rights, and ultimately, the
demise of confidence in the efficacy and impartiality of the National
Labor Relations Boar<;l.129
Rulemaking would require a thorough discussion of the empirical
data and societal consequences of unit determination decisions. It
would allow full participation by the labor movement in the process.
The rulemaking procedure would encourage interested parties (princi
pally unions and employer associations) to fund industrial relations
research which would better equip the Board to design a workable
system which would safeguard the public interest while ensuring em
ployees of non-profit health care institutions the right to organize and
engage in collective bargaining-the goals of the 1974 amendments.
Litigation over unit determinations should decrease, because the
guidelines for those decisions would have been reached by some rough
consensus between management and labor; or at least after full partici
128. "Although both union and management representatives hoped St. Francis [II]
would mean an end to the decade of debate, experts on both sides agree that litigation on
the bargaining unit issue will continue for years." 56 WHITE COLLAR REP. (BNA) 250
(Oct. 22, 1984).
129. Veteran union organizer Eileen McManus related this experience:
I filed a petition for a unit of Registered Nurses in Maryland in 1979, about a
week before St. Francis 0/ Lynwood issued out of the [Ninth] circuit. We made
what was in retrospect an unfortunate decision to maintain our petition for Regis
tered Nurses, which of course the Employer contested. The election was held in a
timely fashion, and we won with better than a two-to-one margin. The employer
refused to negotiate, we filed charges, the Board granted summary judgment, and
the case went to the Fourth Circuit Court. The Court remanded the case to the
Board with instructions to rewrite its decision with more attention to the unit
proliferation issue. The case went back to the Board and stayed there until St.
Francis II issued. It was then remanded to the Region, and we were notified
about two months ago that a new election in an all professional unit had been
ordered.... Given that we still would have won the first election by more than a
comfortable margin if all of the people the employer wanted in had voted and had
voted no, it's been an interesting exercise. In the six years that intervened be
tween our mandate and the decision to order the second election, nearly all of our
organizing committee had been pressured to leave. The unit size, according to
the Employer, has doubled. This is not an isolated case, nor is it even our worst
case.
Address by Eileen McManus, entitled A Union Perspective on Health Care Bargaining
Units, Association of Labor Relations Agencies Conference (July 25, 1985).
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pation by both in the process. Courts of appeals should be expected to
afford deference to future Board unit determinations because the
Board will have brought its expertise in labor relations, not statutory
interpretation, to the issues.
Other commentators have advanced alternatives short of
rulemaking. Attorney Michael Stapp has suggested that the Board
adopt a "rulemaking approach" to the adjudication of unit determina
tions in health care institutions. 13o This approach would balance the
likelihood that patient care disruptions will result from granting a sep
arate bargaining unit to the petitioning employees against the degree
to which employees' organizational rights would be furthered by
granting the requested unit. l3l Stapp argues that only by weighing
the actual threat of patient care disruption against the community of
interest of the petitioning employees and the free exercise of their right
to engage in collective bargaining can the reasoning behind the con
gressional admonition against unit proliferation be implemented and
the "twin goals" of the amendments be realized. 132
Professor of Labor Relations James Gross would have Congress
repeal the language of the Labor-Management Relations Act which
forbids expenditures by the Board for employment of economists and
sociologists. 133 He views this deficiency as an underlying cause of the
Board's vacillation on many important labor relations issues as well as
the reason for the lack of judicial deference to Board expertise. Em
pirical investigation of past as well as potential future effects of Board
policy would give the Board its own source of information by which to
judge the adversaries' arguments in each particular adjudication. An
examination of the results of the Board's decisions by the use of empir
ical data and professional research may aid in gaining enforcement of
Stapp, supra note 48, at 71 n.65.
131. This would be a case-by-case empirical approach which would determine the
propensity for patient care disruptions in a particular institution.
Factors to be considered in determining the likelihood of patient care disruptions
would include the total number of authorization cards signed in the proposed
unit; the different facilities in the proposed unit; the likelihood that a strike by one
particular bargaining unit would be debilitating to the hospital; the likelihood
that other employees would cross picket lines should a strike occur in the pro
posed unit; the authorization card support of the various job classifications within
the bargaining unit; and the past history of labor unrest in the facility (e.g., wild
cat strikes).
Id.
132. Id.
133. RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, supra note 79, at
264-66.
130.

1987]

ST. FRANCIS II

331

its orders in courts of appeals, as well as bolster management and la
bor confidence in the competence and impartiality of the Board.
The ideas advanced here, and in other commentaries, should lead
us to question whether the disparity of interests test is adequate to the
task of achieving the balance between the public need and employees'
rights sought by Congress when it passed the 1974 health care amend
ments to the Labor-Management Relations Act. But we must strike
the proper balance. We cannot allow employees in this vital sector of
our economy to lose faith in our system of labor legislation.l 34
William F. Donahue

134. On May 4, 1987, the Board heard oral argument in the matter of St. Vincent
Hosp. & Health Center & Mont. Nurses' Ass'n, NLRB Case No. 19-RC-11496. That case
is an appeal from a Regional Director's decision, based on St. Francis II, that disallowed a
unit limited to registered nurses requested by the union in favor of an all-professional unit.
The union's appeal is based on St. Francis III. In addition to adjudication, the Board's
alternatives include rulemaking and seeking review by the Supreme Court. At the time of
this writing, the Board has not taken any action.

